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1. Introduction The multiplication of cyber operations which target States' administrations, the economic sector and vital infrastructure 1 is today widely seen as one "the most pressing and potentially dangerous" 2 threats for national and international security. 3 While these operations do not reach the threshold of an "armed attack" within the meaning of jus contra bellum, their damaging impact raises nonetheless pressing questions about the duties of States in this fi eld and the ability of international law to deal with this new threat. For many observers, there is no need to develop new norms. According for example to the White House International Strategy for Cyberspace " [t] he Karine Bannelier-Christakis development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behaviour -in time of peace and confl ict -also apply in cyberspace." 4 Among these customary and "long standing international norms", the principle of due diligence holds a special place. Indeed, this principle obliges States to protect foreign States and their citizens against illegal acts committed by non-state actors on their territories or under their jurisdiction or control.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relevance of this old principle -as it was conceived long before the invention of the "cyber sphere", at a time when space was fi nite and obvious. How can this old wine fi t into the new bottles of ubiquitous and dematerialised low-intensity cyber operations that do not quite reach the level of an armed attack?
I will fi rstly briefl y outline the meaning of due diligence in international law (2). I will then introduce what I call the "cyber diligence" concept, which concerns the applicability of the due diligence principle in cyberspace (3) and discuss the relevance in this fi eld of the fundamental element of knowledge (4). I will then turn to a series of specifi c and tough questions concerning the parameters of this "cyber diligence" obligation and the need to fi nd a right balance between the obligation to protect States and citizens against damaging cyber operations and the obligation to respect other international rules such as, for example, the right to privacy (5). Having this in mind I will thus examine successively the existence of an eventual obligation to enact legislation and domestic norms to forbid and condemn cyber acts against others States and the existence of an obligation of all States to secure their own cyber infrastructure (6). I will conclude with a discussion on the content of the duty to react in relation to cyber acts which are conducted against another State (7).
In order to inform the concept of "cyber diligence", I will use the whole panoply of international Law, from general international law concerning the rights and duties of States, to more specifi c branches, such as the obligation of prevention in international environmental law or the theory of "positive obligations" of states in international human rights law.
Due Diligence as a Principle of General International Law
The principle of due diligence is derived from the principle of sovereignty of States.
According to Max Huber in the Island of Palmas arbitration:
Territorial sovereignty … involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the terri-
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tory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war.
5
This duty of due diligence has since then been reaffi rmed and developed in many cases. Among them, the most famous one is undoubtedly the Corfu Channel case in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) famously said that "every State [has the] obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States". 6 Today, everybody agrees that the dictum of the Court expresses a general principle of international law. It is also accepted that the duty of diligence goes beyond the territory of States and covers "all activities which take place under the jurisdiction or control" of States 7 whereas these activities are conducted by the State itself or by others entities private as public. 
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The "rights" to which the Court refers to are all unlawful acts that produce detrimental effects on another State. 9 Nonetheless, while the occurrence of a damage to a third State is a necessary condition in order to engage the responsibility of the State for violation of the due diligence principle, it is not a suffi cient one. Due diligence is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result.
10 According to S. Heathcote, this means that States should "deploy their best efforts to achieve [the] desired outcome ... even if that outcome need not be ensured".
11 However, the term "best efforts" 12 could give the impression that we are in the borderline between a normative and a merely political obligation. 13 It could thus be better to declare that States have the obligation to "employ all available means" or "to take all available measures", or to "do all that could be reasonably expected of them". 
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[I]t is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of "due diligence", which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. 
3.
From Due Diligence to "Cyber Diligence" As a general principle of international law the duty of diligence applies to all activities including of course cyber activities. According to Rule 5 of the Tallinn Manual, "[a] State shall not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely affect other States." 16 This duty of cyber diligence applies to all cyber activities whether they are of "high" or "low" intensity, and whether these cyber operations are launched from the territory of a State or just routed by the territory of a State. Indeed, despite the hesitation of some experts, 17 there is no legal reason to consider that transit States do not have a duty of diligence and thus could escape their own obligations in this respect. For example, if a State knows that a terrorist group is about to cross its territory to attack a third State, the duty to act and to prevent exists. The same applies Karine Bannelier-Christakis in principle to illegal cyber-attacks. This being said, we should not underestimate the extraordinary challenges created by the nature of the operations and a messy cyberspace. In several cases it would be impossible to prove that there was knowledge of these actions in a transit State. And, even if such knowledge were to exist, the available time for an appropriate reaction is of critical importance. Indeed, as the ICJ recognised in the Corfu Channel case the availability of enough time in order to notify third States and to react is very important in order to assess if a State failed in relation to its due diligence obligation. 18 With regard to the rapidity of transit in cyberspace, it is therefore unlikely that any State of transit could be held accountable for violating the due diligence principle. On the other hand if a cyber-attack is launched using public or private computers located in the transit State and the latter had or ought to have had the knowledge and the means to avert the situation the outcome could be different.
4.
Knowledge as a Decisive Element of the Due Diligence Principle Knowledge is the fi rst decisive element of due diligence. In the Hostages case, the ICJ engaged Iran's responsibility after concluding that "the Iranian authorities (b) were fully aware … of the urgent need for action on their part; (c) had the means at their disposa1 to perform their obligations; (d) completely failed to comply with these obligations".
19
States cannot nonetheless have an absolute knowledge of all things happening on their territory. This is why in Corfu the ICJ stated that "it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known" what was happening. 20 In a similar way the European Court of Human Rights observed, in its famous Osman v. United Kingdom case concerning the right to life, that:
[f]or the Court, and bearing in mind the diffi culties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. 21 18 As the ICJ determined, "Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in suffi cient time before October 22; and the duty of the Albanian coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends on the time that elapsed between the moment that these ships were reported and the moment of the fi rst explosion", Corfu Channel case, supra note 6, p. 
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Knowledge and the Standard of Proof
The fi rst problem is what will then be the standard of proof in order to show that a State knew that hostile cyber operations were taking place on its territory? Due to the fact that States exercise exclusive territorial control within their frontiers, this proof could become a real probatio diabolica for victims. Indeed, the victims of a breach of international law could be unable to furnish direct proof of facts to demonstrate the existence of knowledge. 22 In order to avoid this the ICJ said in the Corfu Channel judgment that it should "be allowed a more liberal recourse to interferences of fact and circumstantial evidence … The proof may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt." 23 In that case the ICJ found that one of the indications of Albanian's knowledge of events was the fact that Albania, after the reported events affecting the United Kingdom, did not inquire into the event nor proceeded to judicial investigation. 
4.2.
The Dilemma between Knowledge and Constructive Knowledge This second problem is even trickier. Although it is uncontroversial that the duty of diligence applies automatically in cases where States have actual knowledge of cyber acts in question 25 one should ask whether it should also be applicable in cases of constructive knowledge, when States ought to have known about a specifi c situation.
The Tallinn Manual has hesitated handing down a conclusion on this point stating that the International Group of Experts "could not achieve consensus as whether this rule applies if the respective State has only constructive ('should have known') knowledge ... if it fails to use due care". 26 22 As the ICJ observed, "the fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility", in Corfu Channel case, supra note 6, p. 
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Here again the case law of the ICJ seems useful. In Corfu Channel the Court said that a State on whose territory an act contrary to international law has occurred "may be called upon to give an explanation [and] cannot evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal." 27 This conclusion is directly linked to the duties related to the exclusive control exercised by States over their territory. In a similar way the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the Human Rights Committee constantly accept the idea of constructive knowledge as part of the "positive obligations" of States in the fi eld of Human Rights. As the ECHR said in Osman v. United Kingdom:
[W]here there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation … , it must be established … that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identifi ed individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. 
4.3.
Knowledge and Monitoring This brings us to the nature of measures that States should adopt in order to be in a position to 'know' if illegal cyber acts which are hostile toward third States take place on their territory. Does due diligence imply an obligation for States to monitor cyber activities on their territory? The answer to this question is positive because, as it will be seen later, due diligence implies not only an obligation to react but also to prevent. Vigilance and monitoring thus go hand in hand.
In the Pulp Mills case the ICJ held that due diligence implied "the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party".
29
The recent French White Book on Defence also presents monitoring as a cornerstone in the fi ght against cyber activities which are dangerous for the security of States. 
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But what a slippery slope! Could due diligence become a kind of Trojan horse in order to erode civil liberties starting with the right to privacy and the respect of correspondence? Electronic surveillance programs such as Prism have given rise to heated debate and have been considered by some as being of an "almost-Orwellian" nature. 31 It should be recalled, nonetheless, that the duty of due diligence can only authorise acts compatible with international law. In the Genocide case the ICJ warned that "it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law". 32 The ECtHR and other human rights treaty bodies also constantly emphasise that the police must exercise "their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice". This question of monitoring is directly linked not only to the requirement of "knowledge", but also to the more general question of the duty for States to prevent an act occurring which is contrary to the rights of others States. 
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5.
Cyber Diligence as an Obligation of Prevention The obligation of prevention as a corollary of due diligence is well routed in international jurisprudence. In the Alabama case, the Tribunal found that:
the British government failed to use due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations; and especially that it omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations made by the diplomatic agents of the United States during the construction of the said number '290', to take in due time any effective measures of prevention, and that those orders which it did give at last, for the detention of the vessel, were issued so late that their execution was not practicable. 35 In the same way the United States-Mexico Claims Commissions in the Youmans case found that State must satisfy its duty of prevention in order to fulfi l its due diligence obligation and that Mexico failed its due diligence obligation by not preventing the attack resulting in the death of American citizens. 36 It is thus not surprising that in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ concluded that "nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania." 37 And about 60 years later in the Armed Activities on the Territory of The Congo, the ICJ held Uganda responsible "for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account". 38 Thus if the existence of a duty of prevention is in no way doubted, the exact content of this duty needs to be discussed.
A Duty of Prevention based on the Criterion of Reasonableness
What kind of measures of prevention do States need to take? The international protection of human rights gives us some very interesting insights in this fi eld, especially with the development of the so-called "positive obligations". Indeed, the international 
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protection of human rights involves not only duties of abstention, but also obligations to act in order to prevent any violations of human rights by non-state actors. The European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and several other treaty bodies have constantly proclaimed the idea that if a State "knew or ought to have known" of the situation and failed to "take appropriate measures" or "to exercise due diligence to prevent" or "to do all that could be reasonably expected of it" therein exists a violation of international law.
39
While all these bodies accept that this "duty to act and prevent" should not create an impossible burden on authorities, they all focus on the criterion of "reasonableness" which is decisive here. In the case Kiliç v. Turkey for example, the European Court of Human Rights held Turkey responsible for the violation of the right to life for the resulting murder of a journalist that the authorities failed to protect despite numerous death threats. The Court said that the authorities failed to act even though "[a] wide range of preventive measures were available which would have assisted in minimizing the risk to Kemal Kılıç's life and which would not have involved an impractical diversion of resources".
40
On the contrary, in the Ärzte für das Leben v. Austria judgment of 1991, concerning the complaint of a non-governmental organisation to the Court about the State's failure to protect demonstrators (during a protest against abortion) against the action of counter-demonstrators, the ECtHR found that there was no violation of Article 13 since it "clearly appears that the Austrian authorities did not fail to take reasonable and appropriate measures" as "a hundred policemen were sent to the scene to separate the participants from their opponents and avert the danger of direct attacks". 
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In other fi elds of International Law also this criterion of "reasonableness" appears in relation with the principle of due diligence. The criterion of "reasonableness" was clearly affi rmed by the ICJ in the Genocide case, 42 but also in several arbitrations concerning the protection of aliens. In the case A. H. Francis v. United Mexican States, the British-Mexican Claim Commission found that despite the murder of a British citizen, the Mexican State had not failed in adopting "reasonable measures" of prevention because " [t] here is no direct evidence whatever of negligence on the part of the authorities, and the British Agent did not even suggest any specifi c measures that they should have taken. In no country in the world can isolated crimes of this nature be prevented". 43 This case also shows that the notion of reasonableness is often cited in relation with the concept of negligence when assessing the respect by States of their diligence obligation. In the old Alabama arbitration, for instance, the arbitral tribunal underlined that "notwithstanding the warnings" the United Kingdom did not take the effective measures of prevention and thus found that there was "negligence" 44 on the part of that State.
An Obligation to Enact Preventive Domestic Normative Measures?
Does the "duty to prevent" include a duty to enact legislation and domestic normative measures? If we accept that such an autonomous obligation exists, we might slip from the kingdom of obligations of "conduct" to the one of obligations of "result". In the fi eld of human rights, several treaty bodies insist on the existence on an obligation "to adopt laws for the effective protection of the rights and freedoms" 45 proclaimed by human rights treaties. The responsibility of States has often been engaged by human rights treaty bodies for failure to adopt necessary domestic measures. 46 We maybe fi nd ourselves at the limits of the comparison between the theory of positive obligations in human rights law and the general international law due diligence principle. Indeed one could argue that the "positive obligation" to take legislative, judicial and administrative measures in the fi eld of human rights derives directly from the commitments of States under human rights treaties -such as Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 47 But could such an obligation exist in the fi eld of cyber diligence without a specifi c treaty? It goes without saying that enacting legislative measures in order to prevent and punish cyber acts contrary to the right of other States is one of the best ways to implement the "due diligence" obligation. Measures of prevention of cyber-attacks will require almost inevitably such legislative measures and many States have already expressed their concern to adapt their legislative framework in this fi eld. 48 But since due diligence is an obligation of conduct States do have the choice of the best measures to take depending of the circumstances.
Consequently we come to one of the limits of due diligence in relation to lowintensity cyber operations. If we want to "upgrade" State's obligations concerning cyber diligence, in order to impose specifi c and detailed obligations on States the adoption of an international treaty would probably be necessary. One of the best examples of this is, of course, the Convention on Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001. 49 This Convention provides for the harmonisation of the domestic criminal substantive law elements of offences in the area of cybercrime and also provides for the domestic criminal procedural law powers necessary for the investigation and prosecution of such offences. 50 These measures are very important but only a multilateral instrument can introduce such specifi c obligations.
Whatever the conclusion -whether or not there is an obligation for State to enact domestic law in order to prevent cyber activities contrary to the rights of others States, it is interesting to note that, according to the tribunal in the Alabama case, States cannot claim the insuffi ciency of its legal means to justify its failure in due 
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An Obligation to Protect Cyber Infrastructure? Related to the question of adoption of an adequate legislation stands the question of whether a State has an obligation to protect its cyber infrastructure against any interference or misuse.
According to the US International Strategy for Cyberspace, cybersecurity due diligence implies that "States should recognize and act on their responsibility to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from damage or misuse". 52 In the same vein the French Livre Blanc sur la Défense focused on the need of securing vital infrastructure. 53 In March 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted also a very interesting resolution entitled "Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures". 54 Annexed to this Resolution the UN General Assembly adopted a "Voluntary self-assessment tool for national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures calls States to determine and assess the protection of their vital infrastructure".
But whatever the interest of these incentives, the question is to know whether due diligence includes an obligation for States to protect their own cyber infrastructures. The answer should be that due diligence requires States to take "all appropriate measures" in order to avoid cyber-attacks. If a State totally failed to secure its own cyber infrastructure, a failure which then authorised hostile groups to use this infrastructure as a weapon, the responsibility of the State could be engaged. As the ICJ judged in the Genocide case, "violation of the obligation to prevent results from omission". 55 But unlike the adoption of legislation, States are not equal when they try to protect their infrastructures. In the Alabama case the US said that due diligence "is a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the dignity and 
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But the obligation to react is not just an obligation to notify. As the Tallinn Manual has rightly recognised, in case of injury to another State the State where the cyber operation takes place will be obliged to use all means at its disposal "to terminate the activity". 61 If the obligation of termination of the illegal activity is not controversial in itself, the implementation and the exact scope of this obligation could raise some questions. Indeed, in order to stop a cyber-attack, States can use different tools that have, in some cases, more or less serious negative effects on third-parties countries and civilians. There is in this fi eld an obligation for States to assess the necessity of their reaction and its proportionality.
62
Of course, as always, this test is not an easy one. But it is nonetheless necessary in order to avoid states acting in a disproportionate manner or using the principle of due diligence as a mere pretext in order to follow a hidden agenda. During the evaluation of the proportionality and the reasonableness of the reaction, one should take once again into account the fact that these measures do not violate international law and especially human rights law. As stated by the US International Strategy for the Cyber Space, freedom of expression, intellectual property and rights to privacy are among these fundamental freedoms that State should protect.
63
Moreover States have an obligation to investigate and punish the authors of such acts. Once again we can recall that in the Corfu Channel case the ICJ found that an indication of Albanian's knowledge of what was occurring was the fact that Albania, after the events affecting the United Kingdom took place, did not inquire into the event nor proceeded to judicial investigation "incumbent, in such a case, on the territorial sovereign". 64 The case law of the human rights treaty bodies is also very clear in this fi eld. Due diligence includes a duty to investigate. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights famously proclaimed in the Velásquez Rodríguez case:
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished. … the State has failed to comply with its duty. … In certain circumstances, it may be diffi cult to investigate acts that violate individual 61 Schmitt, supra note 7, p. 28, para. 9. 62 As the Tallinn Manual states, "[t]he nature, scale and scope of the (potential) harm to both state must be assess to determine whether this remedial measure is required. The test in such circumstances is one of reasonableness", ibid., p. 27, para. 4. 63 The White House, supra note 4, pp. 23-24. 64 As the Court pronounced, "[a]nother indication of the Albanian Government's knowledge consists in the fact that that Government did not notify the presence of mines in its waters, at the moment when it must have known this … further, whereas the Greek Government immediately appointed a Commission to inquire into the events of October 22, the Albanian Government took no decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed to the judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on the territorial sovereign", Corfu Channel case, supra note 6, pp. 19-20.
